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This paper presents a uni¿ed framework to highlight possible channels for the
international transmission of ¿nancial shocks. We ¿rst review the different de¿nitions and
measures of contagion used in the literature. We then use a simple multi-country asset pricing
model to cast the main elements of the current debate on contagion and provide a stylized
account of how a crisis in one country can spread to the world economy. In particular,
the model shows how crises can be transmitted across countries, without assuming market
imperfections or DG KRF portfolio management rules. Finally, tracking our classi¿cation, we
survey the results obtained in the empirical literature on contagion.
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1
In the past few years, crises in one region have been followed by crises in countries that
are geographically distant, have different economic structures, and do not share signi¿cant
economic links. Recent crises with these features have raised three sets of questions.
First, what are the channels for the international transmission of area-speci¿cs h o c k s ?
Trade in goods and services is an obvious candidate, but ¿nancial markets and ¿nancial
intermediaries also play an important role in propagating shocks across regions. If a crisis
in one market induces a signi¿cant change in portfolio strategies of ¿nancial intermediaries
and investors, this change may also affect asset pricing in markets that, in many ways than
one, are distant from the one in which the crisis originated. Trade and ¿nancial spillovers may
of course have different signs: some spillovers may amplify, while some may dampen or offset
the initial shock. The international transmission of shocks is also in￿uenced by the decisions
of national and international policymakers. The international impact of a shock in one country
may be magni¿ed by the action of domestic policymakers, as well as by the reactions of those
in other countries.
Second, are there discontinuities in the intensity of the international transmission
mechanism? Are there channels of international transmission that are only active during a
crisis? This is partly a question about the strategy to follow when building theoretical and
empirical models of contagion. But it is also a relevant issue in the design of policies to
contain the undesirable effects of transmission.
Third, should international investors and policy makers worry about the rise in
correlationduringperiodsof market instability? Internationalinvestors maybe concernedwith
the bene¿ts of diversi¿cation. If correlation across assets is signi¿cantly higher in periods of
crisis – the argument goes – diversi¿cation may fail to deliver exactly when its bene¿ts are
needed most. By the same token, the international transmission of negative shocks may spread
to countries with very different fundamentals. If this is the case, national welfare may decline
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Corsetti, Aviram Levy, Paola Monti, Roberto Rinaldi and Andrea Zaghini for valuable comments. This paper
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sbracia.massimo@insedia.interbusiness.it.8
independently of the state of national economies, at least to some extent. What policies could
mitigate this adverse side effect of international market integration?
The headlines of the debate along the lines sketched above usually refer to ‘contagion’.
Currency and ¿nancial crises that spread abroad –such as thosein Mexico in 1995, in Thailand
in 1997, in Russia in 1998 etc. – are (at least potentially) contagious, as opposed to crises that
do not spread. This is not to say that crises that are not contagious have no international
spillovers. In principle, it could be argued that the spillovers from the 1999 Ecuador debt
crisis were as strong as those from any other crisis in the previous few years. Yet the behavior
of domestic and international institutions, both public and private, prevented or contained
potentially disruptive international effects from this speci¿c crisis. In equilibrium, all we saw
was a crisis circumscribed to one country.
The current debate suggests that contagion has both a qualitative and a quantitative
dimension. First, the label contagion – as opposed to, say, ‘systemic crises’–conveys the idea
that economic models stressing fundamental channels of international transmission without
allowing for asymmetric information, learning, indeterminacy of equilibrium and the like,
fall short of providing a convincing account of what is going on. If they do provide an
account – critics would point out – they do so by engaging to at least some extent in H[￿SRVW
rationalization of the events. Second, internationally integrated markets exhibit sizable co-
movements in economic variables. Hence, tests for contagion versus interdependence should
be based on the identi¿cation of structural breaks either in the data-generating process or in
some of the statistics, such as the cross-country correlation of asset returns.
In the literature, there is a considerable amount of ambiguity concerning the precise
de¿nition of contagion, and how we should measure it: there exists no theoretical or empirical
de¿nition on which authors agree. Theaim of this paper is to providea state-of-the-art account
of the analysis of contagion, while addressing a set of basic issues that, for one reason or
another, have been left backstage in the current debate – and which we instead believe are at
the core of any study of international transmission mechanisms.
The paper is organized as follows. We ¿rst provide an outline of de¿nitions of contagion
and different ways to approach the empirical evidence on it (section 2). In section 3 we
introduce a simple model of interdependence in which the transmission of ¿nancial shocks9
occurs without recourse to portfolio models and market imperfections. In light of this model,
we then reconsider the theoretical literature on contagion. An important issue addressed
in this review concerns the presence of discontinuities in international transmission, caused
for example by panics, asymmetric information and learning. In section 4, we review the
empirical evidence of the transmission of shocks and recent attempts to assess the presence of
discontinuities.
￿￿ :KDW LV FRQWDJLRQ"
2.1 ’H¿QLWLRQV
While there is no consensus on exactly what contagion is, there are a few representative
de¿nitions that are commonly adopted in the literature. We list ¿ve of them.
De¿nition 1 &RQWDJLRQ LV D VLJQL¿FDQW LQFUHDVH LQ WKH SUREDELOLW\ RI D FULVLV LQ RQH FRXQWU\￿
FRQGLWLRQDO RQ D FULVLV RFFXUULQJ LQ DQRWKHU FRXQWU\￿
This de¿nition is usually associated with empirical studies of the international
implications of exchange rate collapses. It accounts for the observation that exchange rate
crisestend to involve largesetsof countries, whilesomeof thecountriesin thesetsmay beable
to avoid devaluation despite being hit by strong waves of speculative pressure. This de¿nition
is consistent with many different views about the international transmission mechanism, as
it does not specify which factors underlie the initial crisis and its spread. For instance, a
crisis may be systemic, in the sense that devaluations are an equilibrium outcome of a policy
game among national governments, facing a shock to fundamentals. Such devaluations would
nonetheless be labelled as contagious.
De¿nition 2 &RQWDJLRQ RFFXUV ZKHQ YRODWLOLW\ VSLOOV RYHU IURP WKH FULVLV FRXQWU\ WR WKH
¿QDQFLDO PDUNHWV RI RWKHU FRXQWULHV￿
A stylized fact in international ¿nancial markets is the rise in asset price volatility that
occurs during periods of ¿nancial turmoil. This de¿nition exploits the fact that crises can
be identi¿ed with peaks in volatility, and measures contagion as volatility spillovers from
one market to another. Asset price volatility is generally considered a good approximation
of market uncertainty. Hence, in an interpretation of this de¿nition, contagion refers to the
spread of uncertainty across international ¿nancial markets. Note that a simultaneous rise in10
volatility in different markets might be due to normal interdependence between these markets
or to some structural change affecting cross-market linkages. This distinction is at the base of
the de¿nitions that follow.
De¿nition 3 &RQWDJLRQ LV D VLJQL¿FDQW LQFUHDVH LQ FR￿PRYHPHQWV RI SULFHV DQG TXDQWLWLHV
DFURVV PDUNHWV￿ FRQGLWLRQDO RQ D FULVLV RFFXUULQJ LQ RQH PDUNHW RU JURXS RI PDUNHWV￿
The merit of this de¿nitionis its immediateappeal: it ¿ts what iscommonly perceived as
contagion, such as the spread of ¿nancial instability after the Hong Kong stock market crash
in October 1997, or after the Russian crisis in the summer of 1998. Note that, by stressing
the quantitative dimension (a ‘signi¿cant increase’), it conveys the notion of contagion as
‘excessive co-movements’, relative to some standard. The open issue is thus to draw a
distinction between excessive and normal co-movements in prices and quantities due to simple
interdependence.
De¿nition 4 ￿6KLIW￿￿FRQWDJLRQ RFFXUV ZKHQ WKH WUDQVPLVVLRQ FKDQQHO LV GLIIHUHQW DIWHU D VKRFN
LQ RQH PDUNHW￿
The implications of contagion according to this de¿nition are somewhat similar to those
of thepreviousone. Shift contagion occursif thetransmission mechanism somehowintensi¿es
in response to a crisis in one country. The phenomenon could therefore also be measured in
terms of excessive co-movements of prices and quantities across countries – although tests
for structural breaks in the data-generating process would probably be more appropriate.
A different identi¿cation of a standard for interdependence is at the core of the following
de¿nition.
De¿nition 5 &RQWDJLRQ RFFXUV ZKHQ FR￿PRYHPHQWV FDQQRW EH H[SODLQHG E\ IXQGDPHQWDOV￿
This de¿nition of contagion is theoretically precise in the framework of models that
allow for the possibility of multiple instantaneous equilibria in the presence of a coordination
problem. If the spread of a crisis re￿ects an arbitrary switch from one equilibrium to another,
fundamentals cannot explain its timing and modalities. The state of fundamentals may
nonetheless explain why some countries are vulnerable to crises while other countries are
not. For instance, if contagion spreads via liquidity crises, then a low level of international
reserves relative to short term total liabilities puts a country at risk.11
De¿nition 5 may also apply, however, to cases in which coordination problems among
economic agents are not associated with arbitrary mechanisms of equilibrium selection.
Sudden discontinuities in the time series of prices and quantities are not necessarily driven
by ‘sunspots’. Introducing incomplete information, for instance, may rule out multiplicity of
equilibria in standard models of bank runs and currency crises. For given fundamentals, small
differences in private information or in the degree of uncertainty of agents’ expectations can
trigger signi¿cant changes in thebehaviorof economicagents. However, theseevents aremore
likely when fundamentals are weak.
Consistent with these de¿nitions, theories explaining the spread of a crisis from one
country to another can be classi¿ed in two broad groups, depending on whether or not they
predict a structural break in cross-market linkages conditional on a crisis. While these two
views are very different at the theoretical level, it is very hard – if not impossible – to
distinguish between them on empirical grounds. One crucial issue is that multiple-equilibrium
models of crises and contagion are not falsi¿able, and there exists no universally accepted
methodology to test them. Some authors try to circumvent this issue by assuming arbitrary
processes regulating the switch across equilibria, and test the hypothesis of indeterminacy
of equilibria conditional on these processes being true. Others proceed by testing many
possible econometric models based on fundamentals, and interpret the failure of these models
in explaining crises and contagion as evidence for multiplicity. The basic tenet of the latter
approach is that, if the true model were based on fundamentals, the econometrician would
surely include a test of this model in his work. Note however that, even if the true fundamental
model were known to the econometrician, he would still have a hard time to distinguish
between switches across possible equilibria due to sunspots, to changes in the degree of
uncertainty of agents’ expectations or to information ￿ows that are not publicly observable.
2.2 0HDVXUHV
Corresponding to the broad de¿nitions discussed above, empirical measurements of
contagion are explicitly or implicitly based on the following methodologies.12
6SUHDG RI FXUUHQF\ FULVHV DQG LQVWDELOLW\
Consider the ¿rst de¿nition which focuses on the probability of currency collapses. For
each country in the sample, consider some weighted sum of exchange rate changes, interest
rate movements and variations in international reserves, capturing speculative pressures in
the exchange and money markets. De¿ne a crisis in country ￿ as an extreme value of this
indicator – say, above two standard deviations from the sample mean. Using an appropriate
set of control variables, the econometrician can test whether a crisis in country ￿ leads to a
signi¿cant increase in the probability of a crisis in another country. In principle, a similar
methodology could be applied to ¿nancial markets, but the identi¿cation of a ‘crisis indicator’
is more dif¿cult in this case.
Studies based on this de¿nition are often related to empirical analyses that look for an
appropriate set of macroeconomic and ¿nancial ‘indicators’, in order to forecast currency
crises correctly. A very recent development in this literature concerns the inclusion of
indicators capturing vulnerability to contagion, often stemming from some sort of ¿nancial
linkage between countries.
9RODWLOLW\ VSLOORYHUV
One methodology commonly used to assess the occurrence and direction of volatility
spillovers is based on the estimation of multivariate GARCH models. Consider the following
data-generating process:







where - ’d o￿c￿￿￿￿co?o￿ is a vector of rates of return, ￿ ’d k￿c￿￿￿￿ck?o￿ is a vector of constant
numbers, ￿ denotes a matrix of factor loadings and u ’d s￿c￿￿￿￿cs?o￿ i sav e c t o ro fg l o b a l
factors. The vector of country-speci¿c shocks L ’d ￿￿c￿￿￿￿c￿?o￿ has a covariance matrix given
by P,w h e r e￿, ( and . are matrices of constant numbers. Once this model is estimated one
can measure the effects of, say, the country-speci¿c shock ￿￿c|, on the volatility of country ￿,
the covariance between markets ￿ and ￿, and the volatility of country ￿. Stochastic volatility13
models that generalize equation (2) by including a noise term could also be used in this
perspective.
&RUUHODWLRQ LQ UDWHV RI UHWXUQ
Next, let us turn to studies of co-movements in ¿nancial markets, as stated in the third
de¿nition. Consider the ￿-th and ￿-th rows of the process (1) and, for the sake of simplicity,
assume a single factor model:
o￿ ’ k￿ n ￿￿ ￿ sn￿￿
o￿ ’ k￿ n ￿￿ ￿ sn￿￿ . (3)
These expressions make it clear that an increase in the sample correlation of rates of
return is not necessarily evidence for contagion, as it may be caused by an increase in the
movements (variance) of global factors. Some empirical tests that attempt to address the issue
of contagion versus interdependence compare cross-market correlation in tranquil and crisis
periods. However, suppose that a crisis in country ￿ is characterized by an increase in the
variance of the global factor s and of the country-speci¿c disturbance ￿￿. During the turmoil,
some co-movement across markets is merely an implication of interdependence – as both
markets ￿-th and ￿-th depend on s|. Contagion will instead occur when the observed pattern
of co-movement in asset prices is too strong in relation to what can be predicted when the
mechanism of international transmission is held constant. Hence, the key to these studies is
the speci¿cation of an appropriate theoretical measure of interdependence, able to capture the
international effects of an increase in the volatility of asset prices for a given transmission
mechanism.
A related approach consists in explicitly assuming a given joint distribution for o￿c| and
o￿c|, instead of starting from a process like (3). Once a crisis is de¿ned as the event described
by a particular subset of possible occurrences of o￿ – say, a crisis is the event o￿ 5 ￿ – the
sample correlation between the two rates of return conditional on o￿ 5 ￿ is compared with
their unconditional correlation. Interestingly, one can show that for the commonly adopted
hypothesis that Eo￿co ￿￿ is a normal bivariate random variable, this approach is no more than a
speci¿c instance of the previous model.14
&KDQJHV LQ WKH WUDQVPLVVLRQ PHFKDQLVP
In the fourth de¿nition, contagion occurs when the transmission mechanism intensi¿es
during the crisis in country ￿. An example is a country-speci¿c shock that becomes ‘regional’
or ‘global’. This means that there is some factor # for which factor loadings are zero in
all countries but one during tranquil periods, and become positive during crisis periods. An
illustration of this concept of contagion is provided by the following two-factor model:
o￿ ’ k￿ n q￿ ￿ s nE 0 n 0￿￿
o￿ ’ k￿ n q￿ ￿ s n ￿￿ ￿ 0 n 0￿ . (4)
If interdependence,￿￿ ’f , so that the process is equivalent to the data-generating
process (3) by setting ￿￿ ’ 0 n 0￿. Contagion occurs when the country-speci¿c shock 0
becomes a global factor, L￿H￿ when ￿￿ 9’f . Measures of interdependence based on factor
model (3) are derived under the null hypothesis ￿￿ ’f . Thus, they will be unaffected by a
change in the speci¿cation of the process for the rates of return, which uses the expressions
(4) instead of the factor model (3).
&KDQJH LQ UHJLPHV
Empirical studiesthat incorporatediscontinuitiesinthedata-generatingprocess areoften
based on Markov-switching models. This class of models speci¿es a number of regimes for
relevant economic variables and estimates the probabilities, described by a Markov transition
matrix, of moving from one regime to another. This approach has the advantage that
discontinuities can be directly attributed to jumps between multiple equilibria. However,
the number of regimes is arbitrarily ¿xed and the switch across equilibria is regulated by an
exogenous process so that the nature of the phenomenon effectively captured by the regimes
is not clear .
2.3 &DYHDWV
,QLWLDO FULVLV DQG FRQWDJLRQ
De¿nitions and tests of contagion work well in the presence of a clearly identi¿able,
exogenous initial shock in one market or group of markets. Starting from the ‘¿rst’ crisis15
country, one can apply the above methodologies to test whether the spread of instability is
consistent with ‘business as usual’,o rr e ￿ects something more than interdependence.
Some problems arise when the initial shock is not speci¿c to a particular country or
market. The eruption of a crisis in one particular country may itself be an equilibrium
phenomenon, its causes residing elsewhere. Does a correct identi¿cation of the origin of a
crisis matter? In many of the tests reviewed above, the answer is yes. For instance, in the third
type of empirical test de¿ned above, the measures of interdependence depend heavily on the
variance of the return in the country that is assumed to be ‘¿rst’.
By the same token, splitting the sample between ‘crises’ and ‘tranquil’ periods is often
arbitrary. In the literature on currency collapses, such a split depends on an arbitrary cutoff
value for the indicator of crisis. In tests based on a joint distribution of returns, periods of
crisis coincide with periods of extreme values of the variable under consideration – say the rate
of depreciation of the exchange rate. In other cases, econometricians need to use institutional
information to date crisis periods. Note that this is true even in tests where crises are de¿ned as
an increase in the variance of rates of return – this information is not used in the identi¿cation
of crisis periods, but only to correct the correlation coef¿cient within the period.
)UHTXHQF\ DQG ODJV
Consider again measures of contagion based on the correlation of rates of return
de¿ned by (3). Over which frequency should we expect a crisis in country ￿ to trigger a
correlation across country-speci¿c disturbances? Early studies of contagion have focused on
the correlation of intra-day price movements, under the null hypothesis that one market reacts
to the information content of price movements in other markets. By the same token, event
studies have analyzed the effect of news in one market on the instantaneous price volatility in
other markets. Note that in either case contagion is expected to manifest itself as a persistent
and signi¿cant increase in correlation in times of a crisis relative to tranquil periods.
Onecould think, however, that contagion may well takequitedifferent forms. Contagion
is likely to manifest itself in infrequent but signi¿cant changes in the pricing process that
are correlated – with some lags – across markets. It is far from obvious that these changes
should lead to higher correlation at daily, weekly or monthly frequencies: country-speci¿c
factors during a crisis may actually reduce correlation in price movements over some of16
these frequencies. Consider for instance a crisis in country ￿ leading investors to revise their
expectations of average productivity in country ￿. As the coef¿cient k￿ is adjusted downwards
after a crisis in country ￿, contagion results in a one-time adjustment of the level of the stock
market in country ￿.
3ULFHV DQG TXDQWLWLHV
In addition to affecting asset prices, a substantial change in default, exchange rate and
political risk also affects the willingness of investors to extend their credit to a country. It is
possible that movements in prices tell only part of the story – the crisis spreads primarily via a
correlated withdrawal of international credit to a set of countries. Thus, an exclusive focus on
rates of return may not be entirely appropriate.
￿￿ 7KHRU\ RI FRQWDJLRQ
3.1 $ VLPSOH PRGHO RI ¿QDQFLDO LQWHUGHSHQGHQFH
This section introduces a simple model of international transmission drawing on
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) and Lucas (1982). Notation and speci¿cation follow Obstfeld
and Rogoff (1996) and Corsetti (2000). The objective is to classify the main elements of the
current debateon contagion within thesimplest model of portfolio allocation and asset pricing,
providing a highly stylized account of how a crisis originating in one country can spread to the
world economy.
2
Consider a two-period economy comprising ￿ countries.
3 Each country ? is endowed
witha¿xed quantityof output t ?
| inthe¿rst period, andastochasticquantityof output t ?
|n￿Er￿
in the second period, where r denotes a particular state of nature. The process generating the
cash ￿ow t ?








5 In interdependent markets, a shock to the cash ￿ow from one asset or a change in the statistical properties
of this cash ￿ow may lead to a portfolio rebalancing that alters the demand for all other assets. If the asset supply
is in¿nitely elastic the shift in the demand curve does not produce any change in the vector of prices — the
international transmission would only be re￿e c t e di ni n v e s t m e n t￿ows. If the supply is not in¿nitely elastic, the
portfolio rebalancing will alter the price vector, affecting all markets. This second dimension of the international
transmission may be lost if the theorist or the econometrician speci¿es an exogenous process for asset supply.
6 The model could be easily extended to the in¿nite-horizon case￿ here we focus on a two-period model in
order to provide some numerical examples.17
where u indicates the vector of global factors, and K is a vector of country-speci¿cf a c t o r
loadings. The disturbance 0 has zero mean.
In each country there is a continuum of national consumers with mass 1. Consumers









Each national consumer is endowed with a fraction of national resources. To write the
budget constraint, denote with T ?
| the value at | of the uncertain stream of domestic output in
country ? at | n￿ . We can think of T as the value of a mutual fund holding the universe of
¿rms operating in country ?. It may be worth noting that T ?
| does not necessarily coincide
with the value of country ?’s market, as this may also include ¿rms operating abroad. Clearly,
T ?
| is a price, and will be determined endogenously in equilibrium. Assume that claims to
period | n￿net national output are traded worldwide. The budget constraint of the national

























6 denotes the share of the claim to country 6 output in period | n￿ , owned by the
representative consumer in country ?.
Referring to the discussion in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) for details, we characterize an




| n T ?
| S￿
6’￿Et 6
| n T 6
| ￿
. (8)


























| is world output in period |. In equilibrium, all individuals in the world will hold the
same portfolio of risky assets, in proportion to the share of their endowment in world wealth.
That is, country ? will hold a share of country 6 mutual fund %?






Thekeyto understand thisequilibriumisthat,becauseofCRRApreferences, theoptimal
portfolio of risky assets is invariant in relation to the level of wealth: all consumers invest the
same share of their wealth in the country ￿ fund. Consumers will, however, have different
levels of wealth.
4















































The above expression is useful to shed light on the basic structure of international
transmission. We should note here that, in equilibrium, some countries may well run a current




Country ￿ may ¿nance its excess imports by issuing equity-like assets, but it could also
issue debt. Using a straightforward application of the Modigliani-Miller theorem, we can
interpret T
￿
| as the price of a portfolio combining both equities and bonds, the latter issued
at the current equilibrium interest rate. Country ￿ could sell default-free bonds paying a cash




















7 In Lucas (1982), preferences are not necessarily CRRA, but are identical across individuals. Thus, in
a perfect pooling equilibrium there can be no differences in individual wealth that could induce differences in
individual portfolios.19
In the equity market, country ￿ would then issue claims to a stream of output equal to
t
￿




To clarify the features of this model, consider a simple numerical example with two
states of nature, each occurring with equal probability. The endowment of the ¿rst country
– which we will refer to as the ‘industrial country’–is t ￿
| ’2 fand t ￿
|n￿ ’ i￿fc2fj,t h e
¿rst ¿gure in curly brackets referring to the ¿rst state of nature with Df per cent of probability.
The endowment of the rest of the world – comprising all emerging market economies – is
t 2
| ’￿ f c and t 2
|n￿ ’ i2fc￿fj. Note that there are two key differences between the industrial
country and the emerging markets: one is the level of initial output, the other the distribution
of output across states of nature. Assuming for simplicity that the coef¿cient 4 is equal to 2,















































The group of emerging economies as a whole is a net debtor, while the ¿rst country is
a net creditor in the world economy. Reinterpreting T 2
| as the price of a portfolio combining
both equities and bonds, we could assumethat thesecountries sell a claim to a stream of output
equal to i￿fcfj, in the equity market. They then sell default-free bonds paying a cash ￿ow
equal to ￿f. Using the asset pricing equation above, we can see that the value of this bond at
time | will be ￿f: in equilibrium, the rate of interest is endogenously determined and equal to
o ’f . The value of the rest of the national portfolio – consisting of equities – will be 5. These
¿gures provide a baseline scenario for simple numerical analyses of crises and contagion in
the following.20
3.2 7KH WUDQVPLVVLRQ RI VKRFNV GXH WR LQWHUGHSHQGHQFH
In this section we will use our simple model as a guide to map the main ideas in the
current debate on contagion. First, we need a de¿nition of crisis.
De¿nition 6 $ FULVLV LQ FRXQWU\ ? DW WLPH | LV DQ XQH[SHFWHG FKDQJH LQ WKH GLVWULEXWLRQ RI t ?
|n￿
WKDW LQFUHDVHV WKH ULVN RI LQYHVWLQJ LQ FRXQWU\ ?￿
Note that a crisis could correspond to a change in the distribution of any of the elements
on the right hand side of (5). Examples include amean-preserving shock affecting the country-
speci¿cdisturbance0?, a drop in theexpected average productivity of thecountry ￿?, a change
in the distribution of global factors u, or even a change in country-speci¿c factor loadings K?.
Starting from a baseline scenario, we will study the international effects on prices and
consumption due to a crisis in country ?. We will examine three main types of contagion. The
¿rst focuses on fundamental transmission. The second and the third analyze the propagation
of shocks due to panics and to incomplete information, learning and updating by international
investors. We will stress that the last two channels produce discontinuities in the international
transmission of the initial crisis.
3.2.1 )XQGDPHQWDO FKDQQHOV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO WUDQVPLVVLRQ
,QWHUQDWLRQDO LPSOLFDWLRQV RI FRXQWU\￿VSHFL¿F VKRFNV
A ¿rst set of contagion models focuses on fundamental channels of transmission
abstracting from information imperfections. To start with, observe that a country-speci¿c
crisis will primarily affect T ?, but will also affect the price of all other assets through the
stochastic discount rate qL￿E￿|n￿￿*L￿E￿|￿. As the stochastic discount rate depends on the
world endowment in the two periods, the indirect effect of a crisis in country ? will be larger,
the larger the size of the economy that is hit by a crisis. It is well understood, for instance, that
price movements in large markets, such as the US market, lead to price movements in many
other markets. However, such co-movements are rarely referred to as “contagion”. Because of
the relevance of size, one may expect this channel to be small in the case of crises in emerging
markets.21
To capture the ￿avor of the international transmission of disturbances that are speci¿ct o
output from one country, we now present a few back-of-the-envelope numerical calculations
based on our model. Starting from the numerical values presented at the end of the previous
section, assume that, in the initial equilibrium, output ￿ow of country 2 is t 2
| ’Dand
t 2
|n￿ ’ i￿fcDj–notethat thisemerging market economy isratherlarge: perhaps thefollowing
example is best suited to a regional, rather than a national crisis. Initially, T 2
| ’￿ f ￿￿ and
>2 ’f ￿2b, so that this country (or region) is a net importer at time |.
Consider now a crisis in the form of a mean-preserving spread of the country-speci¿c
disturbance 0?. According to our de¿nition, a crisis consists of a change in the distribution
of t 2
|n￿: we assume t 2
|n￿E02 crisis)=i￿Dcfj. Relative to our initial set of numerical values,
the distribution mean of t 2
|n￿ is the same (7.5), but its variance has increased. As expected,
a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of country 2 national output leads to a drop of


















￿ f￿D’. ￿D .
The shock is transmitted abroad, via the stochastic discount factor. Observe that a crisis
increases the world interest rate, which becomes a positive number, and changes the relative
price of future output in both states of nature. The price of output in states of nature r ’￿
increases relative to output in state of nature r ’2 . Country 1 – the developed country –
has a distribution of output across states of nature tilted in favor of the second state of nature.
Not surprisingly, its stock market looks much better after the shock. The equilibrium price


















￿ f￿D’2 f ￿S .
This price movement could be interpreted as the result of a “￿ight to quality”,i nt h e
sense that international portfolios are re-allocated towards less risky investments. The weight
of the industrial country in the international portfolio increases from .￿ to .S per cent.22
The impact of a crisis needs to be not positive for countries with a different distribution
of endowment across states of nature. In our example, the stock market value of the rest of
the emerging markets as a whole falls from ￿f￿￿ to .￿D. Moreover, consider a country within
this group, say country ￿, with a more pronounced imbalance in the distribution of endowment
across the two states of nature: t ￿
| ’Dand t ￿
|n￿ ’ iHc￿j. For this country a crisis in the
second economy implies a sizeable drop in the market, from T ￿
| ’D ￿￿ to T ￿
| ’e ￿￿.
The intensity of the transmission through the stochastic discount factor also depends on
risk aversion. Suppose risk aversion were higher, say 4 ’￿instead of 2. In this case, price and
portfolio movements after a crisis would be more sizeable – say, the post-crisis stock market
price in the second country would fall by ￿b instead of 2. per cent.
To sum up. Country-speci¿c shocks spread via the stochastic discount rate. Unless
asset supply is perfectly elastic, any crisis will induce equilibrium price movements and some















While the rate of return in this country falls, rates of return abroad can either rise or fall,
depending on the distribution of output across states of nature, as well as on preferences.
*OREDO VKRFNV￿ VSLOORYHUV DQG V\VWHPLF FULVHV
The spread of crises can of course be driven by global shocks – in our stylized model,
these would correspond to a change in the perceived distribution of one of the global factors in
the vectoru. Thedomesticimpact from a global shock –bothsignandmagnitude–depends on
the structural features of each economy: this idea is captured by allowing for country-speci¿c
differences in factor loadings ￿?.
It is worth stressing that factors and factor loadings are also a stylized way to capture
international policy spillovers and policy interdependence. For instance, a country-speci¿c
shock that is matched by policies with international spillovers should be part of u. Monetary
spillovers, in the formof competitivedevaluations, would berepresented in this way. AFKDQJH23
inthe distributionof u could correspond to a changein policy regimeaffecting theinternational
economy – a notable example being the creation of the euro.
$Q H[WHQVLRQ
A popular example of global fundamental shocks affecting ¿nancial and exchange
markets world-wide are movements in terms of trade and commodity prices – such as those
preceding and accompanying the eruption of the Asian crisis. Many observers have discussed
the signi¿cant impact of the crisis in countries as different as Canada, Chile and New Zealand,
stressing that these economies are all suppliers of primary commodities.
As regards the international transmission of ‘policy’ shocks through trade links, Corsetti
HW DO￿ (1998) revisit the logic of competitive devaluations in the context of the “new open
economy macroeconomics”. The international impact of a devaluation in one country depends
on the elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic goods, as well as on the pricing
strategies pursued by ¿rms. Recent evidence on the importance of trade links in propagating
currency crises is provided by Bentivogli and Monti (2001), Dasgupta (2000) and Forbes
(2000).
Examples of policy shocks with strong international implications include the high
interest rates pursued by the Bundesbank after the German re-uni¿cation and before the ERM
crisis in 1992-93, the increase in the US interest rates in the months preceding the Mexican
crisis, and the strength of the dollar, coupled by the weakness of Japan, before and during the
recent crisis in South-East Asia. We will discuss this topic in depth below.
(IIHFWV RI UXOHV RI WKXPE LQ SRUWIROLR DOORFDWLRQ
The international impact of country-speci¿c shocks is magni¿ed when investors follow
‘rules of thumb’ in portfolio allocation, or are subject to regulations limiting the scope
for portfolio diversi¿cation. We cannot explicitly model these rules within the framework
presented above – after all, these rules must be adopted because of market imperfections that
make the portfolio problems different from the one we have considered. We can, however,
provide an equivalent equilibrium representation of the effects of rules of thumb in portfolio
formation.24
Observe that, in our calculations above, a mean-preserving spread of country 2 output
induces a fall in the portfolio share invested in the (now) riskier, emerging markets (hereafter
.￿)f r o m2b to 2e per cent. Suppose that investors follow some arbitrary rules of thumb
>
.￿ ’ >EjR￿c>
￿ ￿ f ,
such that they respond to increasing portfolio risk jR by substantially reducing their exposure
to risky investments. As the emerging markets are now riskier, it is plausible to assume
that the share of international portfolio invested in assets from these countries will fall below
the equilibrium value, 2e per cent. After a crisis in country ￿, international investors would
mechanically reduce the share of their wealth invested in emerging markets to 2f per cent.
Now, using our model, we can calculate the theoretical mean-preserving spread in
the cash ￿ow from emerging markets that would support a 2f per cent portfolio share in
equilibrium. In other words, we could build an equivalent equilibrium representation of any
arbitrary rules of thumb, in terms of an implicit change in the perceived distribution of the
cash ￿ow in period | n￿ . In our speci¿c example, one of the possible theoretical cash ￿ows
(denoted with a tilde) would be h t .￿
|n￿ ’ iDfcfj.
3RUWIROLR PDQDJHPHQW UXOHV DQG FRQWDJLRQ
When investors follow rules such as the onespeci¿ed above, acrisis in one country tends
to reduce the availability of international resources for the emerging market economies as a
whole. The role of investors’ rules of thumb in spreading contagion is explored by Schinasi
and Smith (1999). These authors assume an exogenous process driving rates of return. They
therefore analyze contagion only in terms of correlated changes in portfolio allocation, rather
than in prices, which are ¿xed by assumption. Similarly, some authors stress value at risk
or prudential regulation as an implicit mechanism of ampli¿cation of ¿nancial shocks, via
portfolio adjustment by ¿nancial intermediaries.
Schinasi and Smith (1999) show that the international transmission of shocks can
be explained “with the basic principles of portfolio theory without recourse to market
imperfections”. The authors show that the transmission usually occurs even when a
representative investor uses simple portfolio management rules (hereafter PMR) to allocate25
her wealth among international assets. Indeed, if one views perfect markets as Arrow-Debreu
economies with utility-maximizing agents, the very use of PMRs can be considered as a form
of market imperfection. For instance, most of these rules can lead to the choice of dominated
portfolios, which is inconsistent with expected utility maximization.
Let >Rc|n￿ and jRc|n￿ be the expected return and the standard deviation of a portfolio R at
period | n￿ . In a setup with two risky assets and one safe asset, Schinasi and Smith compare
three different PMRs:
– PMR 1 (([SHFWHG UHWXUQ EHQFKPDUNLQJ UXOH). The investor chooses the portfolio which
warrants at least an expected return >Rc|n￿ A &, and minimizes the risk jRc|n￿.
– PMR 2 (7UDGH￿RII UXOH). The investor maximizes the following linear combination of




– PMR 3 (/RVV￿FRQVWUDLQW UXOH). The investor chooses the portfolio which warrants the
largest expected return >Rc|n￿, under the constraint that the probability that the return -Rc|n￿
is below a given -W, is smaller than a threshold 6.
5
Theauthorsconsidertwokindsofshock: (a) an increaseinthevarianceof agenericasset
price at period | n￿(YRODWLOLW\ HYHQW)￿ (b) a decrease in the market value of an asset (FDSLWDO
HYHQW). Following any of the two shocks on one asset, two distinct effects on the demand of
all risky assets are at work: a VXEVWLWXWLRQ HIIHFW￿ which makes investment in the other asset
more attractive, and an LQFRPH HIIHFW￿ which makes the entire portfolio less attractive (because
of its increased risk) than a risk-free asset. Moreover, the ¿nal outcome will depend on the
covariance matrix of the returns on assets.
In the case of a volatility event, the transmission of the shock depends on the adoption of
a speci¿cP M R .S p e c i ¿cally, a volatility event on one asset never causes a decrease in demand
for the other risky asset, if the investor uses the H[SHFWHG UHWXUQ EHQFKPDUNLQJ UXOH. With
this rule, in fact, the substitution effect dominates and demand for the other asset increases.
8 The PMR 3 is also known among pundits as YDOXH DW ULVN (VaR). In fact, it is possible to write the
problem as
pd{￿s>w.4
v=w= =S u^ Yw.4 ?Y ￿‘ 9 p ,
where Y ￿ is the YDOXH DW ULVN chosen by the investor, Yw @ Zw ￿ Ew is the market portfolio value, given by
the algebraic sum of risky assets, Zw, and borrowings, Ew.26
With the WUDGH￿RII UXOH￿ a volatility event induces a reduction in the demand for all risky assets,
provided that returns on assets are negatively correlated. By contrast, under the ORVV￿FRQVWUDLQW
UXOH￿ a volatility event makes demand for all risky assets decrease, provided that the risk
tolerance parameter is suf¿ciently ‘high’, whatever the sign of the correlation between risky
assets.
In the case of a capital event, for any PMR and any unleveraged portfolio, optimal
rebalancing involves reducing higher-yielding positions and investing the proceeds in lower-
yielding assets. If the portfolio is leveraged, a capital event may lead to sales of all risky assets
and to a corresponding reduction in leverage.
6
3RUWIROLR PRGHOV ZLWK LPSHUIHFW LQIRUPDWLRQ
Kodres and Pritsker (1999) present a portfolio model which features four types of agent:
informed traders, uninformed traders, liquidity traders and noise traders. Agents are informed
or uninformed depending on their knowledge of expected returns from the asset. Feedback
traders invest their assets following the market, i.e. buying when prices rise and selling when
they fall. Liquidity traders invest on the basis of idiosyncratic shocks, corresponding to their
needs of liquidity.
In a standard VLQJOH IDFWRU PRGHO, the existence of a common risk factor determines
the transmission of shocks. In particular, the authors consider a speci¿c shock represented
by the arrival of information on the expected return of a given asset. Such an information
shock typically affects all asset prices whose fundamentals co-move with the common risk
factor, with a sign and a magnitude that depend on the covariance matrix. In particular: (a)
the magnitude of the price response in other markets to shocks in one market is larger if the
shock originates in amarket whose asset covariates more in relation to the common risk factor￿
(b) shocks are transmitted towards markets whose covariance in relation to the common risk
factorisgreatest￿ (c)themagnitudeofthepriceresponsein all marketsincreases ifinformation
asymmetries increase.
9 Unlike Calvo (1999), in this framework the role of margin calls is not crucial. The requirement imposed
by margin calls could be met by deleveraging, without affecting portfolio allocation. Since a capital event induces
a decrease in leverage, margin calls can be effective on the demand for risky assets only if they require a larger
decrease in borrowing than the one imposed by unconstrained optimization.27















where t ￿ct2ct￿ are the cash ￿ows from assets, ￿￿c￿￿ are constants, s￿, s￿ are common
factors, and %￿, %￿ are idiosyncratic shocks.
7 This model is intended to represent a world
with a developed country, like the United States (here labeled as country 2) and two emerging
markets, say Russia and Brazil. In this framework, Russia shares a common factor with the
United States, as well as Brazil, but the two emerging countries do not share any factor.
Kodres and Pritsker show that even if emerging markets are not structurally linked and
the idiosyncratic components are independent, the transmission of a shock from Russia to
Brazil does occur. In fact, the transmission is channeled by the developed country although,
surprisingly, prices in this country are not affected by the shock. This result provides a
theoretical explanation for the role of mature markets in the mechanism of international
transmission of shocks across countries that are not structurally linked.
8
Note that in both the single factor and multifactor models, hedging does not affect the
sign of the transmission. It may however affect the volatility of asset prices.
$PSOL¿FDWLRQ HIIHFWV RI SUXGHQWLDO UXOHV DQG UHJXODWLRQ
A different approach to contagion – still related to the fundamentals of the economy
– analyzes the empirical relevance of the so-called FRPPRQ OHQGHU effect. The focus is on
the consequences of ￿uctuations in asset prices and default risk on the balance sheets of
international¿nancialintermediaries. Consideracrisisin onecountryincreasing therisk levels
of the international positions of an international bank. If the bank reacts by rebalancing its
: In their original model Kodres and Pritsker use a multifactor model with returns on assets instead of cash
￿ows. Our modi¿cation does not change their results.
; On this topic, see also Calvo (1999).28
portfolio and reducing its exposure to emerging markets, a crisis in one country may translate
into a credit crunch elsewhere.
A related channel of contagion operates via the effect of ￿uctuations in asset pricing
on the balance sheet of debtors. To the extent that creditworthiness depends on the value of
FROODWHUDO, ¿rms owning assets in a crisis country may face higher borrowing costs and/or
credit constraints in crisis periods.
In general, the banking system can also contribute to the transmission of ¿nancial shocks
through bank runs and bank panics and through the moral hazard caused by the presence of
explicit or implicit government guarantees on deposits. However, while the importance of the
exposure to acommon source offunding hasbeen con¿rmed by many recent empirical studies,
bank runs havebeen proven to be not very relevant as causes of ¿nancial distress, and evidence
on the effects of public guarantees is still very controversial (Sbracia and Zaghini, 2001b).
3.2.2 7KH LQWHUQDWLRQDO WUDQVPLVVLRQ RI SDQLFV
A different set of models focuses on panics and coordination problems. For this set of
models we need to qualify our de¿nition of crisis, since changes in the distribution of future
output in a country are now conditional on a panic.
Consider a country that is a net borrower in period |. Suppose that in this country output
endowment in period | n￿is no longer exogenously given, but depends on the ability of the
country to borrow on top of its endowment in the previous period. If this is not possible, the
output endowment in the second period endogenously shrinks to some level that is consistent
with this country not being a net borrower. This is of course an exceedingly simple way to
capture the macroeconomic essence of a panic, where a credit constraint emerges as a result
of a coordination problem among investors.
For instance, we have seen above that, in the initial equilibrium, country 2 borrows from
the rest of the world (hereafter ‘) >2 ￿t ‘ ￿t 2
| ’f ￿2b￿￿f￿D’2 ￿2. Suppose that country
2 output at time |n￿is conditional on the ability of this country to borrow 2￿2 – we may think
of a sort of productive consumption. If this country is denied international loans, however,
its output becomes t 2
|n￿EQR ORDQV￿’i2cDj. Suppose also that all international investors are
small and that there are limits to short sales, so that no single international investor can take29
an arbitrarily large position in the stock market of country 2. The equilibrium allocation in the
world economy will then depend on which particular set of expectations international investors
coordinate. In a no-crisis equilibrium, we have seen that the second country has market value
equal to ￿f￿￿, corresponding to a share in the world portfolio as high as 2b per cent. Given that
all investors coordinate on this equilibrium, it is individually optimal to invest the equilibrium
share 2b per cent, in country ?.
If, however, international investors coordinate on an equilibrium in which they give no
credit to this country, the share of their portfolio in country 2 assets is lower, and output in
country 2 falls in a self-ful¿lling way. The value of country 2 stock market becomes S￿H, while
its share in the world portfolio shrinks to slightly more than ￿H per cent. In equilibrium, this
country is a net lender.
Coordination of investors may be driven by a sunspot, or by a different mechanism, such
as the one studied by Morris and Shin (1998, 1999). Clearly, different models of panics may
correspond to different mechanisms of international transmission.
Consider a crisis in country 2 that is driven by sunspots. It would be transmitted abroad
in the same manner as a country-speci¿c shock, as studied above. There is nothing about
contagion in a sunspot-driven panic, unless one is willing to assume that coordination crises
tend to be correlated internationally. But this assumption would be completely arbitrary and
not very informative.
Conversely, models that attempt to study the determinants of swings in investors’
con¿dence may provide a framework for the simultaneous analysis of crises and contagion.
In Pauzner and Goldstein (1999), investors receiving private signals about the state of the
fundamentals optimally follow trigger rules, such as a run on a bank if the signal about its
fundamental investments is more negative than a certain endogenously derived threshold. In
general, this trigger will depend on investors’ wealth. A bank crisis reducing investors’ wealth
in one country may lead to a revision of the trigger. As a result, a bank crisis in one region
may increase the probability of bank crises in other regions.30
&RQWDJLRQ WKURXJK PXOWLSOH HTXLOLEULD LQ FXUUHQF\ FULVLV PRGHOV
Multiple equilibria related to coordination problems form the base of second-generation
models of currency crises (SGMs). In these models, ¿rst developed by Obstfeld (1994 and
1996), devaluation is the government’s optimal response to the actions of speculators and can
take place as a result of self-ful¿lling beliefs, without a previous worsening of fundamentals.
9
Since speculative attacks raise the cost of defending a ¿xed exchange rate, SGMs may exhibit
self-ful¿lling multiple equilibria. For instance, consider an economy where government
policies are consistent with the maintenance of a pegged exchange rate, but the market is
dominated by the sentiment that the currency will be depreciated. If a speculative attack raises
the cost of defending the peg, it might eventually force the authorities to abandon its defence.
Thus, speculators’ beliefs turn out to be self-ful¿lling.
Some of the most interesting results in SGMs concern the case of incomplete
information. Buildingonsomedevelopmentsontheconceptofcommonknowledgeandglobal
games (Carlsson and van Damme, 1993), recent studies have unraveled two main ¿ndings.
First, if agents have (suf¿ciently informative) private information, the incomplete information
game has a unique equilibrium (Morris and Shin, 1998) and there can be no sunspot equilibria
(Heinemann and Illing, 1999). Second, when speculators have a (public) prior probability
distribution on fundamentals, an increase in uncertainty (proxied by the variance of the prior
distribution) may move the economy from multiple equilibria to a unique equilibrium with a
speculative attack (Sbracia and Zaghini, 2001a).
The transmission of shocks in SGMs can involve additional channels with respect to
those operating in ¿rst-generation models. In traditional models, a crisis in country A may
be transmitted to country B only if it entails a worsening of the fundamentals of the latter
country (e.g., because of ‘structural’ trade or ¿nancial links). Moreover, the deterioration in
B’s conditions must be large enough to induce a speculative attack. In SGMs, the transmission
can also operate via an ‘information channel’. Suppose that the economies A and B are not
structurally linked, but B’s fundamentals fall in the intermediate range of multiple equilibria.
The news of a crisis in country A is a public signal that does not modify the structure of
the equilibria (which remain multiple) and does not affect the state of B’s fundamentals.
< By contrast, in ¿rst-generation models – originally developed by Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber
(1984) –¿nancialcrises follow adeteriorationin thestateoffundamentals, typically dueto inconsistenteconomic
policies.31
However, because of multiple equilibria, this new signal may be the sunspot that leads agents
to coordinate their action towards a speculative attack equilibrium that forces B to devalue. In
other words, the economy can experiment a ‘MXPS’ from a good to a bad equilibrium.
Incomplete information SGMs highlight other interesting channels of contagion. Any
country is disseminated with public information that certainly affects its economy, even if this
may occur in a way that it is not entirely clear to speculators. Political rumors or social events,
for instance, are often very dif¿cult to interpret. Although such information is public, it may
be differently interpreted by different speculators. These public signals could therefore play
t h es a m er o l ea sp r i v a t ei n f o r m a t i o n ,
10 opening new channels for contagion.
Suppose that the fundamentals of country B are in the intermediate region, and suppose
that the country has not experienced speculative attacks. Once a crisis in A occurs, although
it does not produce a worsening of B’s fundamentals (as A and B are not structurally linked),
it may produce some uncertainty among speculators about the way in which ‘the other
speculators’ will interpret this new signal. Since agents’ reaction to this kind of news can
be unpredictable, this public signal can be considered as private. The shift from a model with
complete (or public) information to one with private information implies a shift from multiple
equilibria to a unique equilibrium. Hence, it is possible that, with public information, the
economy was in the intermediate region, and multiple equilibria allowed the authorities to
sustain the peg. When private information arrives (or when a blurred public signal, like the
news of the crisis in A, is observed), they determine a speculative attack.
A similar mechanism can also be caused by an increase in uncertainty. Sbracia and
Zaghini (2001a) show that increased uncertainty – possibly due to a crisis in another country
– can be suf¿cient to produce a speculative attack. Note that, unlike the case of sunspots, in
these models there are no ‘jumps’ between multiple equilibria. Rather, private information
and uncertainty determine a ‘shift’ from a multiple equilibria to a unique equilibrium model,
where a speculative attack is the sole possible outcome.
43 Morris and Shin (1998) explain in this way why some speculative attacks seem to be triggered by events
not directly connected with the economy, like rumors of political troubles in the Mexican crisis in 1994, or the
announcement of a referendum in France, before the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis in Europe in 1992.32
3.2.3 ,QFRPSOHWH LQIRUPDWLRQ￿ OHDUQLQJ DQG XSGDWLQJ
A different set of models of contagion focuses on subjective beliefs, learning and
updating. Suppose that a crisis in market ? leads to a revision of the subjective probability
distribution of country-speci¿c disturbances elsewhere. A change in ￿? n 0? may lead to a
change in the perceived distribution of ￿6 n 06 for some 6. The equilibrium effect on prices
will now re￿ect both country-speci¿c considerations, and a change in the world stochastic
discount rate.
Suppose that a crisis speci¿c to country 2 induces a new view among international
investors, so that the output process for the emerging market economies as a group becomes
t .￿



















￿ f￿D’H ￿e ,
while the developed (¿rst) country market is boosted. The stock market share in the crisis
country is the 2b per cent of the world stock market.
The literature provides different examples of this line of reasoning. Some authors claim
that, becauseof thecost of gathering information, internationalinvestorsdo notassesscountry-
speci¿c risk correctly, and treat different economies as if they were homogeneous group. A
crisis in country ? can be seen as a public signal that leads international investors to reassess
pro¿tability in any country 6 with similar characteristics to country ?: geographical location,
current account de¿cits, public sector de¿cits and so on.
Belief-updating and learning are at the core of the debate on the spread of the 5XVVLDQ
YLUXV to Brazil. Some observers stress the information content of the decision by the IMF to
suspend ¿nancial guarantees to Russia. In light of the Russian crisis, the IMF appeared to
be less ready to stand in support of crisis countries. Investors then reassessed the riskiness of
their positions in Brazil (Corsetti HW DO￿￿ 1998). Other authorshighlight asymmetricinformation
across investors. Assume that, realistically, investors who had taken long positions in Russia
were (at least ex ante) signi¿cant and well-informed. Hit by the Russian crisis, these investors
were needed cash to meet margin calls. Suppose that, for this reason, they sold Brazilian
assets. If this were the case (it is a big ‘if’), less-informed investors may not have been able to33
see the true motivation for the sale. Suspecting that well-informed investors knew something
about Brazil that the rest of the market ignored, they were willing to buy only at a substantial
discount.
+HUG %HKDYLRU
While in a standard Arrow-Debreu framework trades among agents occur
simultaneously, in recent years many models have examined the consequences of VHTXHQWLDO
trades. Suppose that agents take VLPLODU GHFLVLRQV (e.g., buy/sell, attack/don’t attack,
withdraw/remain), choose VHTXHQWLDOO\,h a v eSULYDWH LQIRUPDWLRQ,a n dFDQ REVHUYH HDFK
RWKHU¶V DFWLRQV. Since any action reveals at least part of the information on which it is based,
any early decision can be rationally exploited by other agents in their subsequent choices. In
other words, any early action has a feedback effect on later decisions. Several models have
shown that, in this environment, agents tend to ignore their own information and prefer to take
decisions by relying completely on the previous actions of other agents (KHUG EHKDYLRU).
11 In
particular, agents will all select the same action after a certain threshold of observed actions
and, in ¿nancial markets, they will give rise to discontinuities.
Despite the large body of literature on herd behavior, few models have analyzed its
connections with the international transmission of shocks. Calvo (1999) considers the huge
¿xed costs necessary to gather information about emerging economies. Such costs generate
economies of scale, which induce the ¿nancial industry to organize itself in clusters of
specialists. It is thus possible to distinguish between informed and uninformed agents in
a given country. Informed agents are likely to have highly leveraged portfolios (they have
more incentives to borrow in order to ¿nance their investments, due to the precision of their
information) and, therefore, are more vulnerable to margin calls. When uninformed agents
observe an informed agent selling (or not buying) an asset, they cannot establish whether
this action re￿ects negative information about the asset or is caused by margin calls. In this
model, if fundamentals have a higher level of volatility than margin calls, when uninformed
agents observe an informed agent shortening her position, they believe that this is due to a
44 Note that herd behavior occurs even if there are no externalities in agents’ payoffs. When payoff ex-
ternalities are included in the analysis, Dasgupta (1999) shows that agents may either completely neglect their
own information (VWURQJ KHUG EHKDYLRU) or may be over-optimistic with respect to a situation where information-
processing grants an ef¿cient outcome (ZHDN KHUG EHKDYLRU).34
sudden worsening of the fundamentals. They may then react by imitating the behavior of
informed agents and causing a massive capital out￿ow, unjusti¿ed on the basis of changes in
fundamentals.
In a related paper, Calvo and Mendoza (1999) examine the consequences of information
costs. Obviously, the greater the cost of buying information, the higher the incentive to rely on
the freely observable decisions of other agents. As the number of markets grows, the incentive
to gather costly country-speci¿c information weakens, whilst the incentive to imitate arbitrary
market portfolios increases. In fact, when information is costly, the benchmark portfolio
re￿ects an information set that is hardly obtainable by a single investor. Hence, investors
do not update their costly information sets and rationally choose to imitate a pre-determined
market portfolio. In this setup, agents’ behavior becomes very sensitive to rumors, due to the
costof verifyingtheirveracity. Thistendstoincreasevolatilityin¿nancialmarkets,facilitating
the cross-border transmission of country-speci¿c rumors.
￿￿ $ UHYLHZ RI WKH HPSLULFDO OLWHUDWXUH
Empirical literature on the international transmission of shocks is gathered and classi¿ed
in many groups, following the de¿nitions and measures given in section 2. Our classi¿cation
does not claim to be exhaustive, but endeavours to cluster several tests into groups
characterized by similar methodology and scope of analysis.
We distinguish two main kinds of study. The ¿rst considers empirical analyses that
attempt to measure the effect of a shock in one country on other countries. This group
includes SURELW DQG ORJLW PRGHOV, where the initial shock is an extreme value of an indicator
of speculative pressures￿ the OHDGLQJ LQGLFDWRUV DSSURDFK, which builds on probit and logit
models in an attempt to select a parsimonious set of indexes of vulnerability to external or
internal shocks￿ and *$5&+ PRGHOV, which deal with the transmission of volatility shocks.
The second group of studies considers empirical analyses in which contagion is
de¿ned in terms of discontinuities in the data-generating process. This group includes
tests on structural breaks in correlation (also called VWXGLHV RQ FRUUHODWLRQ EUHDNGRZQV)
and estimations of 0DUNRY VZLWFKLQJ PRGHOV, which directly test the presence of multiple
equilibria.
12
45 We neglect empirical studies on herd behavior, becausethey are still at avery preliminarystage and, toour35
4.1 3URELW DQG ORJLW PRGHOV
A seminal approach to the empirical analysis of contagion is made by Eichengreen HW DO￿
(1996). The authors construct an index of H[FKDQJH UDWH PDUNHW SUHVVXUH (ERP), as a weighted
averageofchanges intheexchangerate, short-term interest ratesand international reserves. As
a dependent variable, they de¿ne a ‘crisis dummy’ that takes a unit value for extreme values
of ERP (and zero otherwise) and estimate a probit model with a set of macroeconomic and
political fundamentals among the independent variables. Their estimates from a panel of 20
industrialized countries from 1959 to 1993 show that the occurrence of a currency crisis in
one country increases the probability of a speculative attack in other countries by 8 percentage
points. This effect is not only statistically signi¿cant, but the crisis dummy turns out to be the
most signi¿cant variable in the model. The authors also try to compare two different causes
for transmission: trade linkages and macroeconomic similarities. They build an indicator of
trade linkages and one of macroeconomic similarities and ¿nd that when they include both
indicators in the model only the ¿rst one is statistically signi¿cant.
This technique has since been widely used. Kumar HW DO￿ (1998), who re¿ne the model
by adding lagged ¿nancial and macroeconomic variables, claim that their model has a high
explanatory power. In fact, major crashes (Mexico in 1994, Thailand and Korea in 1997)
are correctly forecast￿ moreover, they show that trading strategies based on their out-of-
sample forecasts could have yield positive pro¿ts during these two episodes. Caramazza HW
DO￿ (2000) also estimate a probit model on a large data set of 61 industrial and emerging
countries. They focuson theroleof externaland internal macroeconomicimbalances,¿nancial
weaknesses(proxiedby theratiobetween short-termdebt andinternational reserves), tradeand
¿nancial linkages. In particular, their model shows that trade linkages (measured by an index
constructed to account also for third market competition) and ¿nancial linkages (represented
by correlation with the stock market of the crisis country) play a signi¿cant role in explaining
the transmission of currency crises.
knowledge, have never been used to analyze the international transmission of shocks. For a review of theoretical
and empirical models of herd behavior, see Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000).36
4.2 /HDGLQJ LQGLFDWRUV
A somewhat different approach to the analysis of currency crises is proposed by
Kaminsky HW DO￿ (1998), who evaluate the ability of a set of macroeconomic and ¿nancial
indicators to forecast the occurrence of a currency crisis correctly. In line with previous
models, a crisis is de¿ned as a month in which the variable ERP takes extreme values.
13 For
each indicator theauthorsestablish athreshold 7, so that theindicator issaid to releasea signal
whenever it is larger than 7.T o¿x the threshold optimally, the authors consider the indicator
obtained from the following table:
crisis within 24 months no crisis within 24 months
signal ￿E7￿ ￿E7￿
no signal ￿E7￿ (E7￿
where ￿ and ￿ are the number of months in which the indicator gives a good and a bad
signal, respectively, ￿ is the number of months in which the indicator fails to release a signal,
and ( is the number of months in which the indicator does not release a signal correctly.
For each indicator, an optimal threshold 7W is determined as the solution to the problem
4￿?￿*￿.
14 Kaminsky HW DO￿ (1998) identify with this method 12 useful indicators, de¿ned
as those indicators for which ￿*￿is less than unity.
This approach has been re¿ned and tested in several papers. Kaminsky (1999) computes
a single composite indicator given by a weighted average of the previous indicators. Further
re¿nements are performed by Bussièr and Mulder (1999) and Borensztein HW DO￿ (1999) who
tested the similar Early Warning System model developed by the International Monetary
46 Unlike Eichengreen HW DO￿ (1996), Kaminski et al. (1998) do not consider changes in interest rates in their
ERP variable.
47 The method is equivalent to minimizing the DGMXVWHG QRLVH￿WR￿VLJQDO UDWLR,g i v e nb yE@+E.G,@D@+D.
F,, because +D. F,@+E . G, depends only on the number of crises in the sample and not on the threshold V.37
Fund.
15 Finally, Hardy and Pazarba¸ sio￿ glu (1998) identify macroeconomic and ¿nancial
indicators for banking crises.
In a recent paper, Berg and Pattillo (1999) show that the original set of indicators
developed by Kaminsky HW DO￿ (1998) performed poorly in predicting the Asian currency
crisis. They estimate the thresholds with data available until April 1995, and ¿nd that most of
the months of crisis (about 91 per cent) were not signalled, while around 44 per cent of the
crisis signals were false alarms. Recent econometric models that have started to include in the
analysis indicators of vulnerability to contagion – often stemming from the so-called common
lender channel – typically get better performances (Sbracia and Zaghini, 2001b).
4.3 *$5&+ PRGHOV
Empiricalstudies ofthetransmission of shocksacross ¿nancial markets with generalized
autoregressiveconditional heteroskedastic (GARCH) modelshavebeenproposed by HamaoHW
DO￿ (1990), who analyzed the transmission of volatility after the stock market crash of October
1987. The authors ¿nd evidence of volatility spillover effects from the US and UK stock
markets to the Japanese market. Interestingly, while these effects are statistically signi¿cant,
spillovers in other directions after 1987 or in any direction before 1987 are much weaker.
Edwards (1998) focused on the transmission of volatility across Latin American bond
markets after the Mexican crisis in 1995. He estimates a univariate GARCH model which
shows that the increase in volatility in Mexico had a signi¿cant impact on the volatility of the
bond market in Argentina, and not in Chile.
Engle HW DO￿ (1990) tackle the question of the causes of yen/dollar intra-day volatility.
In particular, they wonder if such volatility has only country-speci¿c autocorrelation (KHDW
ZDYHV) or is affected by spillovers from other countries (PHWHRU VKRZHUV). In order to test
the relative importance of the two hypotheses, they consider the intra-day volatility of the
yen/dollar exchange ratefrom 3 October 1985 to 26 September 1986. Although Japanese news
seems to have the largest impact on volatility, their GARCH model supports the hypothesis of
meteor showers. Similarly, Fleming HW DO￿ (1998) analyze the co-movements of volatility in
48 The Early Warning System developed by the staff of the IMF features ¿ve variables: current account
de¿cits as percentage of GDP, export growth, misalignments of the real effective exchange rate, short-term debt
over international reserves, and percentage change in international reserves.38
US, UK and Japanese bonds, showing that volatility in Tokyo and London is characterized by
PHWHRU VKRZHUV, whilst in New York it is due only to KHDW ZDYHV.
4.4 6WXGLHV RI FRUUHODWLRQ EUHDNGRZQV
An in￿uential study by King and Wadhwani (1990) examines the changes in correlation
coef¿cients between different markets that occurred after the stock market crash of October
1987. The paper investigates why, in October 1987, almost all stock markets fell together,
despite widely different economic circumstances. In their model, the transmission of shocks
among stock markets of the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom occurs as a result
of attempts by rational agents to infer information from price changes. The model assumes
that there are two types of information, idiosyncratic and systematic. The former is country-
speci¿c, the latter affects all markets. Since the information set has two dimensions, the
rational expectations equilibrium is such that stock prices do not fully reveal agents’ private
information. In this set-up, King and Wadhwani de¿ne excessive transmission as a change in
the covariance matrix of returns. Their empirical estimates show that volatility in the London
stock market is higher than usual when the New York Stock Exchange is open. Moreover,
volatility correlation coef¿cients in the London, New York and Tokyo markets signi¿cantly
increased after the 1987 crash.
Baig and Goldfajn (1998) analyze the stock market returns, interest rates, sovereign
spreads, and currencies of ¿ve Asian countries in order to verify the occurrence of excessive
co-movements of these variables during the 1997 Asian crisis. The authors ¿rst ¿nd that, for
each variable, correlation across countries was signi¿cantly higher in the period July 1997 -
May 1998 than in the period January 1995 - December 1996. They then estimate a linear
regression model for each variable and test the effects of own-country good and bad news and
common external factors such as the US stock index and the yen/dollar exchange rate. Their
estimates for Asian stock prices and exchange rates show that bad news typically has a larger
impact than good news, and that correlation coef¿cients of residuals are still signi¿cantly
different from zero, providing evidence of cross-border ‘contagion’.
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49 Similarly, Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) build a set of economic, ¿nancial and political news and ¿nd
that they have a signi¿cant effect on stock prices. Moreover, bad news seems to have a larger impact than good
news.39
The traditional tests of breakdowns in correlation coef¿cients, which typically ¿nd
excessive transmission of shocks and discontinuities in the data generating process, have
recently been challenged. Several papers (in particular, Forbes and Rigobon, 1999￿ Rigobon,
1999￿ Boyer HW DO￿, 1999￿ Loretan and English, 2000￿ Corsetti HW DO￿, 2001) showed that
standard analyses do not consider the problem of VHOHFWLRQ ELDV￿ which occurs whenever tests
are conducted on DG￿KRF subsamples (like the periods of crises).
17 In particular, when two
random variables f and t are positively correlated, their correlation coef¿cient may be an
increasing function of the variance of each of them. In particular, this is always the case if
f and t are normally distributed (Loretan and English, 2000) or if one variable is a linear
function of the other variable (Forbes and Rigobon, 1999).
In general, correlation coef¿cients in speci¿c subsamples tend to be biased in the
presence of heteroskedasticity and endogeneity or if some variables are omitted. Therefore,
when comparing correlation coef¿cients over a speci¿c subsample, one needs to correct the
bias in the coef¿cients generated by the different variances assumed by the variables in that
subsample. For instance, during the crisis periods, economic variables generally show an
increase in volatility. Hence, empirical tests that do not correct for the bias, typically tend to
favor the hypothesis of excessive transmission.
Forbes and Rigobon (1999) estimate a VAR model with daily returns of the stock market
and short term interest rates of several industrial and emerging countries, with reference to
three ¿nancial crisis (the Wall Street crash on October 1987, the Mexican crisis in 1994-95
and the Asian crisis in October 1997). When correlation coef¿cients are adjusted for the
increased volatility, the hypothesis of correlation breakdown is rejected in most of the cases.
18
In fact, they argue that the increase in correlation observable after a shock in one country
is simply due to the interdependence among stock markets and not to a change in linkages.
Similarly, Rigobon (1999) builds an instrumental variable estimator for testing the correlation
breakdown hypothesis relative to 36 stock markets of industrial and emerging countries during
4: King and Wadhani (1990) are aware of the relationship between volatility and correlation as they write:
“wemightexpectthatthecontagion coef¿cientswould beanincreasingfunctionof volatility”(pp. 20). However,
in calculating correlation between markets, they do not correct for the increase in volatility.
4; Their methodology rejects the hypothesis of correlation breakdown for allcountries during theWall Street
crash on October 1987 and during the Mexican crisis in 1994-95. In the case of the Asian crisis, they ¿nd
excessive transmission of the shock originated in Thailand only for Hong Kong and Italy.40
the same crisis episodes, showing that, unlike traditional analyses, the hypothesis is almost
always rejected.
Boyer HW DO￿ (1999) and Loretan and English (2000) re¿ne the methodology by
calculating corrected correlation coef¿cients under the assumption of normally distributed
variables.
19 They compute these coef¿cients for the correlation between daily returns on the
UK FTSE 100 and the German DAX stock indices, between daily returns on German and
British bonds, and between daily returns on the dollar/yen and dollar/mark exchange rates.
The estimates show that the link between volatilityand correlation duringthe Mexicancrisis is
remarkably close to what the theory would suggest, showing no evidence of structural change.
Corsetti HW DO￿ (2001) propose a factor-model approach to the empirical analysis of
correlation breakdowns that gathers all the previous tests into a unique theoretical framework.
They show that previous tests derive their measures of interdependence by making a speci¿c
yet arbitrary identi¿cation assumption about a key parameter, called b-ratio. This is the
ratio between the variance of the country-speci¿c shock and the variance of the global factor
weighted by its factor loading. Tests that implicitly select a low value for the b-ratio tend to
accept the null hypothesis of interdependence, while tests that select a high value for the b-
ratio tend to reject the null hypothesis of no contagion. Corsetti HW DO￿ (2001) apply their model
to the case of the October 1997 stock-market crisis in Hong Kong. They show that when the
b-ratio is estimated – rather than arbitrarily ¿xed – the null hypothesis of interdependence is
erroneously accepted by existing tests in a number of cases, whileit should be rejected in favor
of contagion.
4.5 0DUNRY VZLWFKLQJ PRGHOV
In the last years, a different kind of empirical analysis has been developed to test
discontinuities in the data-generating process, which is based on the Markov switching
model developed by Hamilton (1994) and others.
20 This framework has the advantage that
discontinuities can be directly attributed to jumps between multiple equilibria.
4< Boyer HW DO￿ (1999) extend their results to the case of normal random vectors that make it possible to
account for the case of time series.
53 Markov switching models have been applied to many economic phenomena, including the business cycle,
the term structure of interest rates, the dynamics of ￿oating exchange rates and, more recently, currency crises.
General applicability to the case of models with multiple equilibria is discussed in Jovanovic (1989).41
Jeanne (1997) considers a second generation model of currency crisis in which,
for a given range of fundamentals, multiple equilibria arise and determine three different
probabilities of a devaluation. In his setting, jumps between multiple equilibria correspond to
jumps between the probabilities of a devaluation. Similarly to the classical models illustrated
in the theoretical section, once fundamentals enter a multiple equilibria zone, jumps can occur
as a result of a sunspot, without any further change in the economy. Moreover, such a sunspot
can be represented by a ￿ ￿ ￿ Markov transition matrix, which de¿nes the probability that
the economy will jump from one given probability of a devaluation to another. Jeanne applies
the model to the exchange rate of the French franc with the German mark from January 1991
to July 1993. He considers a set of fundamentals that includes the unemployment rate, the
trade balance to GDP ratio and the real exchange rate. He then estimates a Markov switching
model, ¿nding the following results: (L) after August 1992, the fundamentals of France
entered a multiple equilibria zone￿ (LL) this event was mainly determined by a worsening of
the unemployment rate and an appreciation of the real exchange rate￿
21 (LLL) estimates of the
Markov transition matrix show that, once fundamentals had entered the multiple equilibria
zone, the economy was likely to jump to the highest probability of devaluation￿ (LY) the model
performs remarkably better than a simple linear regression model.
Jeanne and Masson (1998) extend both the empirical and the theoretical framework, by
including non-linearities and the possibility of chaotic dynamics. In particular, they estimate
a model where fundamentals also include a time trend, intended to capture reputation effects
that, as suggested by Masson (1995), should grow gradually as a result of Bayesian learning of
speculators. In this model, thesunspot isrepresented as a2￿2 Markovtransitionmatrix. Their
estimates, performed over a longer horizon (February 1987 - July 1993), yield essentially the
same results as Jeanne (1997).
In a recent paper, Fratzscher (1999) built a model in which the exchange rate pressure
in one country depends on a set of fundamentals of this country, some measures of its
real integration (trade linkages) and of ¿nancial integration with other countries, and the
54 Theappreciationof therealexchangeratecan besurprising, because France hada lower in￿ationratethan
Germany. However, a closer inspection shows that the appreciation was mainly a consequence of the weakness
of the US dollar. As also Giavazzi and Giovannini (1986) documented, when the dollar was expected to weaken,
investors tended to reallocate their portfolio towards Deutsche mark denominated assets, generating tensions in
the European Monetary System. Jeanne (1997) suggests that this effect may have been more important in the
French crisis than is usually acknowledged.42
possibility of regime-switching.
22 He estimates both a 2-regime and a 3-regime Markov
switching model on data from 25 emerging countries from 1986 to 1998. Interestingly, he
¿nds that, although Markov switching models without real and ¿nancial integration perform
well for most countries, any regime-switching is eliminated when integration is included in
the analysis. In particular, the model indicates that the transmission of shocks (from both
real and ¿nancial channels) plays a major role in determining exchange rate pressure both in
tranquil times and during crisis periods. Fratzscher (1999) also uses his estimates in order to
obtain, for any country, a prediction of the severity of the exchange rate pressure during the
Mexican and the Asian crisis and a rank of the vulnerability of countries for both episodes.
A comparison with analogous predictions from some leading indicator models highlights that
Fratzscher’s model with fundamentals and regime-switching does not perform much better.
However, when integration is included, the model provides much better forecasts.
55 Fratzscher (1999) proposes a measure of real integration that is a weighted average of bilateral trade and
competition in third markets. The index of ¿nancial integration is, instead, based on correlation among stock
market returns, after controlling for country-speci¿cf a c t o r s .5HIHUHQFHV
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